In this paper, I offer an inferential conception of computer simulations, emphasizing the role that simulations play as inferential devices to represent empirical phenomena. Three steps are involved in a simulation: an immersion step (from aspects of the empirical set up to the simulated model), a derivation step (that yields the relevant results), and an interpretation and correction step (that interprets the results in light of the empirical set up). After presenting the view, I mention some cases, such as simulations of the current flow between silicon atoms and buckyballs as well as of genetic regulatory systems. I argue that the inferential conception accommodates the integration of empirical and theoretical data; it makes sense of the role that is played by false traits in a simulation, and highlights the similarities and differences between simulations and scientific instruments.
Introduction
Computer simulations are crucial to various aspects of scientific practice. In some cases, they are a source of data about situations in which direct empirical information is hard, or even impossible, to reach. In other cases, simulations guide scientific theorizing. 1 In this paper, I offer an inferential account of computer simulations that highlights the significant role simulations play as inferential devices to represent features of empirical phenomena. I argue that the inferential conception accommodates the integration of empirical and theoretical data; it makes sense of the role that is played by false traits in a simulation, and highlights the similarities and differences between simulations and scientific instruments.
An Inferential Conception of Simulations
The account proposed here expands on the inferential conception of the application of mathematics (Bueno and Colyvan 2011) . According to the inferential conception, the application of mathematics, and scientific representation more generally, involve three basic steps. First, certain features of the empirical set up are selected for representation by immersing them into a given model (the immersion step). By exploring the mathematical resources of the model, results are then derived from the initial information that was embedded into the model (derivation step). Finally, these results are interpreted back into the empirical set up (interpretation step).
Here are two illustrations of the inferential conception. Consider, first, the representation of quantum states in (nonrelativistic) quantum mechanics. In the immersion step, quantum states are associated with certain vectors in a Hilbert space. In the derivation step, the evolution of the system is determined by Schrödinger's equation, and the superposition of states emerges, in part, as a feature of the mathematics. Finally, in the interpretation step, the results are then interpreted back into the empirical set up, and the measurement problem needs to be addressed.
As a second illustration, consider the representation of economic behavior in neoclassical economics. In the immersion step, the behavior of economic agents is associated with maximization principles (e.g. the maximization of profit). In the derivation step, maximization techniques are then used to determine the agent's best choice outcome. In the interpretation step, the results are then interpreted back into the empirical set up. It turns out that actual economic agents do not in fact follow such maximization requirements. Different norms are then introduced, such as Herbert Simon's satisficing (Simon 1982) .
In the case of simulations, instead of simply having a model into which certain features of the empirical set up are embedded, we have a dynamic process in which not only the relevant features of the empirical set up are introduced (immersion step), but also theoretical assumptions are incorporated in order to give structure and dynamics to the simulation. Theoretical assumptions are crucial to the simulation, and in terms of them it is determined what follows from the particular empirical conditions (derivation step). Once the results are obtained, they need to be interpreted, and corrections are introduced, so that these results can be made relevant to the empirical set up (interpretation and correction step). (See figure 1.) The inferential conception generalizes Hughes's (2010) account of representation in terms of denotation, demonstration, and interpretation. Whereas Hughes takes denotation to be a particular relation between the empirical set up and the model (namely, the denotation function from model-theoretic semantics), the inferential conception emphasizes that there are several such relations between the empirical set up and the relevant models: a variety of different mappings can be used, such as (partial) isomorphism, (partial) homomorphism, etc. This is highlighted in the immersion step. Moreover, depending on how such mappings are set up, different mathematical features will be emphasized in the resulting model. This will then have an impact on the results that are derived from the model (derivation step) and how such results are ultimately interpreted (interpretation step). In contrast to Hughes's account, on the inferential conception a number of different mappings are also allowed for in the interpretation stage. Thus, a far more pluralist setting emerges (Bueno and Colyvan 2011). 2 Given the inferential conception of simulation, a case study can be offered to illustrate how it works. Consider, for instance, a simulation that was developed to model the current flow between silicon atoms and certain molecules (Liang and Ghosh 2005) . The researchers used, as the relevant molecules, buckyballs: a well-known and well-understood spherical molecule containing 60 carbon atoms. The simulation predicted how electricity flows when buckyballs and silicon are connected in three distinct wayseach of them corresponding to a different immersion step. In the first case, no chemical bond is involved: the buckyball is just sitting on top of the silicon. In the second case, the buckyball has been connected to silicon by annealing, or heating, the silicon. Finally, in the third case, the buckyball molecule is placed inside of a tiny hole, a natural defect existing in the silicon. (See figure 2, in particular the middle section of the diagram, which highlights each of the three cases of the immersion step.) Figure 2 : Simulation of the electronic conduction between buckyballs and silicon (Liang and Ghosh 2005) As Liang and Ghosh point out:
A variation in the nature of the molecule-substrate bonding leads to a variation in the number and shapes of conductance peaks, while a variation in the tip-sample tunneling gap leads to a variation in the relative peak heights. Our theoretical formulation thus serves a dual purpose: on one hand, it tests our quantitative model for molecular conduction, in particular, on a sophisticated semiconducting substrate; on the other hand, it provides useful insights that allow us to deconstruct the role of contact geometry on molecular conduction. (Liang and Ghosh 2005, 076403-1) It becomes clear that the simulation incorporates empirical data about molecule-substrate bonding and accommodates available information about molecular conduction. Furthermore, the simulation can also be used to provide important theoretical tools to understand certain features of the data, in particular, about molecular conduction in a semiconducting substrate.
In each of the different immersion steps that Liang and Ghosh consider, the derivation step that implements the simulation generates results that are then interpreted, corrected, and compared with available empirical data. In the end, the match between the results of the simulation and the available data was very good. Based on the favorable outcome, the simulation can then be used to generate information about the electronic conduction among different molecules (not only buckyballs) and silicon.
Interpreted in light of the inferential conception, this case indicates how previously obtained empirical data, which were based on various experiments, can be integrated with the theoretical assumptions that were used to construct the simulation. The simulation also connects information about previous experiments with data about potential experiments, and indicates how new data can be generated even about experiments that have not yet been carried out.
Simulations and Scientific Instruments: Similarities and
Counterfactual Dependence
Basic features
Simulations and scientific instruments share important epistemic conditions. I will first consider an attempt to identify such conditions for both, and argue that it doesn't work. I will then offer an alternative proposal that provides, I suggest, a better account.
First, in establishing the reliability of instruments, we may invoke an overlap argument (Hacking 1983, 186-209; Humphreys 2004, 17-22 provides a critical discussion). The reliability of a scientific instrument often relies on cases in which there is an overlap between what we have access to independently of the instrument and the results that are produced by the instrument. If the results obtained without the instrument agree with those produced by the instrument, this supports the instrument's reliability. Similarly, we can test simulations by comparing the results they produce with actual available data (i.e., data obtained independently of the simulation in question). If the simulations successfully replicate the data, they are then used as a guide in cases for which no data are available.
The overlap argument faces a significant problem. Even if there is an overlap between what is obtained independently of the simulation or the scientific instrument and what these tools generate, this does not thereby guarantee that the results obtained in cases where no overlap is available should be trusted. Often the overlap argument is used to calibrate the instrument in question (Humphreys 2004, 20-22) , which wouldn't leave the shop without meeting such requirement. As a result, no additional evidence for the reliability of the instrument can be inferred from the fact that the instrument satisfies the conditions required by the overlap argument.
A second argument that may be used to support an epistemology for simulations in analogy to what happens with scientific instruments can be called the theoretical argument. The central point, as Hacking (1983, 199-200) emphasizes in the case of microscopes, is that we may need theory to build such instruments-although, according to Hacking, not to use them. Similarly, in the case of simulations, theoretical considerations are built into them. Such theoretical considerations underwrite the acceptability of the simulation.
The theoretical argument, however, faces a considerable problem. To the extent that a simulation relies on theoretical assumptions, if these assumptions turn out to be mistaken, the outcome of the simulation will be significantly compromised (the derivation step becomes problematic). This suggests a significant difference between simulations and scientific instruments. In some instances, reliable scientific instruments can be built on the basis of false theories: this is the case, for example, of the first telescopes, which were built at a time when the available optical theory (Kepler's) was not true (the theory was not even consistent). The possibility of building an instrument without relying on theory emerged because theories alone do not underwrite the reliability of instruments; something else does the work. 3 There is, however, an alternative way of developing an epistemology for computer simulations that still relies on the shared structure between simulations and scientific instruments. In the case of instruments, the following counterfactual dependence conditions can be used:
(c 1 ) Had the sample been different (within the instrument's sensitivity range), the output produced by the instrument would be correspondingly different.
(c 2 ) Had the sample been the same (within the instrument's sensitivity range), the output produced by the instrument would be correspondingly the same.
If these two conditions are met, and we know that they are met, we are then in a position to claim that the instrument is tracking relevant features of the sample. Once the counterfactual dependence conditions are established, we can draw inferences from the output produced by the instrument to what is going on in the sample. This process meshes very well with the inferential conception, which can be invoked to describe how such instrumental outputs represent the target phenomena. The outputs are generated in response to suitable interactions between the sample under study and the instruments in question. Given the counterfactual conditions, those traits the instruments are sensitive to are registered on the resulting outputs. This fact entitles researchers to use the interpretation of instrumentally produced outputs as a guide to infer appropriate features of what is taken to be going on in the sampleas long as the outputs in question have been properly produced; that is, as long as they have been generated in accordance with relevant preparation techniques in instruments that satisfy the counterfactual conditions above. Since particular instruments are designed to be sensitive to certain features of the sample, and properly produced outputs are the result of a causal interaction between the sample and the instrument, the outputs can then be interpreted as representing relevant traits of the sample.
In the case of simulations, corresponding counterfactual dependence conditions can also be invoked:
(s 1 ) Had the initial data in the simulation been different, the output it generates would be correspondingly different.
(s 2 ) Had the initial data been the same, the output it yields would be correspondingly the same.
If these conditions are met, and we know that they are met, we are then in a condition to claim that the simulation is tracking relevant features of the data. Moreover, if the counterfactual dependence conditions are established, in principle one could be in a position to draw inferences from the output produced by the simulation to what is going on in the data. (Some qualifications need to be taken into account, and I will address them below.)
Once again, this process is perfectly in line with the inferential conception. Assuming that the simulation has been properly designed and the initial data are accurate, the outputs of the simulation should provide resources for one to infer the corresponding features in the data. This is achieved by properly interpreting the relevant outputs. In some cases, this process can even be extended further, and one may be in a position to produce new data based on the simulation, although this would require the underlying model used in the construction of the simulation to be properly well established.
The inferential conception of simulation is well equipped to accommodate the fact that simulations provide representations of the phenomena they are about by representing the evolution of the phenomena in question over time. Simulations indicate how certain changes in the initial empirical set up yield corresponding changes in the final outcome. In this respect, properly designed simulations are suitable tools for predicting the behavior of the phenomena under study. In the case of the simulation of the current flow between silicon atoms and buckyballs, it allows for the representation of how variations in the position of buckyballs relative to the silicon atoms change the number and shapes of conductance peaks. The simulation represents the evolution of the conduction patterns between buckyballs and silicon. Information about the behavior of different molecules can then be represented, predicted, and studied. In fact, to provide this sort of information is the whole point of the simulation. We have here a form of representational information about the relevant objects of study without requiring an actual physical interaction with such objects (Barberousse et al. 2009 )-data about such interactions and a model representing them are built into the simulation, however.
The process of creating and assessing a simulation involves a close interconnection between, on the one hand, the underlying model, which provides the basic structure for the simulation, and the mathematical framework, which yields the expressive and inferential resources of the model, and, indirectly, of the simulation. An iterated inferential conception can accommodate this situation (see figure 3) . 4 The simulation is built from input obtained, via immersion, from a particular model, which, in turn, is constructed, in part also via another immersion, from particular empirical information, which, in turn, provides data that inform the relevant model. The particular mathematical framework is then used both (i) to specify whatever formal structure the model and the simulation have, and (ii) to obtain particular derivations from the simulation. The results are then interpreted, corrected, and compared with the empirical set up. Throughout this process one finds a very tight combination of empirical and mathematical resources. In fact, on this account, models and simulations go hand in hand. As an illustration, consider the process of modeling and simulating genetic regulatory systems (de Jong 2002) . Genetic regulatory systems control gene expression, and they result from complex interactions between DNA, RNA, small molecules, and proteins. Given the huge number of components in complex interactions that are involved in such processes, it is very difficult to characterize properly their dynamics. Several formal resources have thus been used to help modeling and simulating the dynamics of these systems in mathematical biology. These resources range from directed graphs, Bayesian and Boolean networks through ordinary, partial and qualitative differential equations to stochastic equations. Describing the combination of experimental and computational tools used in such simulations, de Jong notes:
Starting from an initial model, suggested by knowledge of regulatory mechanisms and available expression data, the behavior of the system can be simulated for a variety of experimental conditions. Comparing the predictions with the observed gene expression profiles gives an indication of the adequacy of the model. If the predicted and observed behaviors do not match, and the experimental data is considered reliable, the model must be revised. The activities of constructing and revising models of the regulatory network, simulating the behavior of the system, and testing the resulting predictions are repeated until an adequate model is obtained. (de Jong 2002, 69) We have here a clear expression of the relationship between models and simulations in mathematical biology (although the general description 
Counterfactuals and counterfactual dependence
What is the status (in particular, the truth-conditions) of the proposed counterfactual conditionals? They should not be read as presupposing the truth of events in other possible worlds. It is hard enough to make sense of the actual world, and whatever may happen in any other possible world is largely irrelevant for that. The modal force of such counterfactuals need not go beyond what takes place, or fails to take place, in the actual world. By changing certain conditions in the empirical set up-in particular, in the initial data introduced into the simulation-and examining the corresponding changes in the simulation's output, it is then possible to determine how sensitive the simulation is to the environment. The "environment" in question involves both actual data about the relevant empirical set up and potential data that need not reflect the actual empirical configuration but which are considered in assessing the changes in the simulation's output that are produced by changing its input. Since in scientific practice scientists are ultimately concerned with actual features of the world, possible aspects are invoked to the extent that they are relevant to the understanding of what goes on in the world.
This feature meshes very naturally with an empiricist view, according to which there are no real modalities in nature (van Fraassen 1980; 1989) . On this view, what is possible or what is necessary is represented as features of the models we use to describe the world. Modal properties can be understood as features that depend ultimately on the actual configuration of the relevant objects. If salt is soluble this is because it has a certain chemical composition such that in suitable circumstances it dissolves. The current state of the world is simply one particular configuration, a contingent form, of the various ways it could be. These possibilities are simply particular configurations of the world among a multitude of alternatives. These alternatives, however, need not, and should not, be reified: they do not correspond to other worlds in which each of these possibilities is realized, that is, in which such possibilities are in fact true.
There are several reasons for insisting on this point. There is no need to postulate possible worlds to make sense of scientific discourse (in particular, modal discourse in science). After all, the possibilities in question are physical, causal possibilities about the actual world and are constrained by what is actually the case. Considerations of what goes on in a nearby possible world-assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is such a thing-are just irrelevant to make sense of possibilities in the relevant domain. In this sense, for the purposes of understanding scientific practice, possible worlds are entirely dispensable.
Moreover, it is not clear that there is any reason to believe that such possible worlds in fact exist. The considerations advanced in support of their existence articulated by David Lewis (1986) are ultimately grounded on the theoretical utility of positing possible worlds. However, theoretical utility fails to provide reason to believe in the truth of what is posited. After all, it is often theoretically useful to introduce false hypotheses for the purposes of computational simplifications, idealizations, or abstractions (Humphreys 2004; Cartwright 1983) . The falsity of such hypotheses does not in any way preclude their theoretical utility. In fact, in many instances, it is precisely because the hypotheses are false that they are useful, given that the true hypothesis may be computationally intractable.
What matters for our present concerns is that the counterfactual conditionals in question can be established by determining how changes in the sample induce corresponding changes in the instrument's output. Similarly, in the case of simulations, changes in the initial input produce corresponding changes in the simulation's output. How are these correlations established? First, researchers change the initial inputs of instruments and simulations. They then determine the corresponding changes in the outputs. By examining the variations in the outputs induced by changes in the initial inputs the range of dependence between the relevant parameters is properly determined. A form of interventionism is involved in that invariances under interventions are highlighted and shape the understanding of the relevant dependences (Woodward 2003) . However, in this case, no causal relation between inputs and outputs is assumed. What matters is the dependence relation between them in the context of the modeling and mathematical assumptions that are built into the simulation, and which are revised as needed in light of available empirical data.
It may be argued that this process establishes at best a standard material conditional, rather than a counterfactual conditional, between the inputs and suitable outputs of instruments and simulations. To establish a counterfactual conditional in this case-one that would display a law-like connection-would require one to exhibit some sort of necessity between the events in question. However, it is unclear, or at least it is a contentious issue, whether there are any such real necessities in nature (van Fraassen 1989, chapters 1-5). To assume that the relevant counterfactual conditionals need to express real natural necessities is to adopt a strong form of realism about their interpretation. But this interpretation is not required. One can remain agnostic about, or even deny, the existence of real modalities in nature, but still insist that counterfactual conditionals about instruments or simulations-and these are the only counterfactuals I am concerned with here-have clearly specified truth-conditions. Consider, for example, the counterfactual conditional discussed above: (c 1 ) Had the sample been different (within the instrument's sensitivity range), the output produced by the instrument would be correspondingly different.
This conditional is true just in case the variation expressed in it between the sample and the instrument's output correctly describes the variation in the actual world. The correlations involved express properties of the actual world, and the variations in question are similarly about the latter. The counterfactual expresses the various relations between the inputs and corresponding outputs for instruments. Only properties and relations of objects in the actual world are relevant for that.
In the case of simulations, the counterfactual conditions express relations between possible data input and predicted output. If the simulation has been properly built, a suitable balance will be found between the data that are originally built into the simulation and its internal dynamics. These relations will be refined as the simulation is iterated in accordance with the iterated inferential conception. Given the use of mathematical tools as expressive and inferential devices, the simulation has a dynamics that indicates the evolution over time of the system under study, and based on this dynamics predictions are obtained and compared with the data. Once again, relevant to the assessment of the simulation are ultimately details of the actual world.
There is, of course, a complication in that certain simulations introduce elements that, given computational tractability constraints, cannot be taken literally. They are not true of the actual world. They are, however, partially true: they correctly describe certain selected features of the events in question, and this, again, brings the discussion back to the actual world, as it should. The notion of partial truth has a clear formulation and has been extensively discussed in the literature (Bueno 1997; da Costa and French 2003) .
Data, simulations, and materiality
Based on the analogy between computer simulations and scientific instruments, we can see why computer simulations, similarly to scientific instruments, can in some cases be considered as sources of new data about empirical phenomena. But what is the status of the new data simulations produced?
It is important, first, to distinguish between, on the one hand, the original data that are obtained from scientific instruments via physical, causal interactions and, on the other hand, data that are generated by simulations via purely representational, computational resources. There is a significant difference between causally produced data and data that are just representationally generated. The difference has to do with the fact that scientific instruments track causally relevant features of the phenomena (they were produced by the phenomena in question), whereas simulations track salient representations of the phenomena (which were not so produced). But why is this an important difference? There is at least one reason for that. Scientific instruments provide a very special kind of record of the relevant phenomena since the phenomena themselves generate the instruments' outputs-a physical record is involved. No such interactions are found in the case of simulations (Barberousse et al. 2009 ). Now, why should that difference matter? Does it offer an epistemological advantage of scientific instruments over simulations? The difference does matter given that, due to its interaction with the relevant physical processes, a scientific instrument provides empirically adequate informa-tion about the relevant properties of the sample under study, and thus guides inferences about the target system. It may be said that simulations can play precisely the same role. In fact, the argument goes, one of the goals of a good simulation is to guide researchers so that they can infer properties of the system under study, given the modeling assumptions, as the representation of the system evolves in accordance with the simulation.
I am, of course, sympathetic with this response, since on the inferential conception this is precisely what simulations are expected to do. But it is important to insist that what a simulation typically offers is not the record of measurements of the relevant properties of the system under study, but rather a representation of these properties, given a model of the system in question, via the initial conditions and the modeling assumptions that characterize the simulation. There is, still, a significant difference, in kind, between simulations and the outputs of instruments (as well as experiments that use such instruments).
This doesn't mean, however, that every experiment is always better than a corresponding simulation. As Paul Humphreys and Eric Winsberg have correctly emphasized in their work, there are many cases (in astrophysics, for instance) in which a carefully designed simulation will trump poorly designed experiments-and, in many cases, no experiments at all can be implemented. Had we been able to perform such experiments, or in those cases in which the latter can be performed, had we managed to design them carefully, the assessment could be reversed. So the assessment here needs to be made in light of the particular cases under consideration, the constraints we face and the trade-offs that are made. (I'll return to this point below.) Consider now the case of "hybrid" scientific instruments (and correspondingly "hybrid" experiments that use these instruments), that is, instruments that incorporate simulations as a crucial part of the way the relevant data are obtained. What should be said about them? A case in point, among many others that could be considered, is what goes on with x-ray diffraction instruments. These instruments are built on the assumption that one could bend x-rays. Since no one knew how to physically do that when these instruments were built, a simulation was introduced as part of the construction of the image produced by the instrument, and the results were compared with the output of well-established instruments, such as transmission electron microscopes.
The inferential conception is capable of accommodating the increasingly widespread role that such "hybrid" instruments (and experiments that use them) play in scientific practice. After all, part of the process of securing the reliability of the relevant x-ray diffraction instrument is precisely to compare the images produced by the instrument with suitable changes in the sample, thus assessing the relevant counterfactual conditions for instruments, (c 1 ) and (c 2 ). Built into the very fabric of the x-ray diffraction instrument is something like the iterated inferential conception, since data from the sample is processed by the instrument taking into account the simulation that processes the "bending" of x-rays (in light of accepted theories of the behavior of light). Results are then derived via the simulation and compared with the relevant empirical set up.
It may be argued that the x-ray diffraction case does not involve a simulation. After all, simulations offer information about the evolution of a system given the initial conditions introduced into the simulation, whereas x-ray diffraction instruments provide inferences from certain effects to their causes, something simulations never do.
In response, it's not clear why simulations cannot provide inferences from effects to their causes. In fact, there's nothing in the nature of simulations that seem to prevent this from happening. If simulations don't usually proceed in this way, this is just a contingent aspect of the most common way of using them. They can be-and, in fact, I'd suggest have beenused in just this way, as x-ray diffraction instruments, scanning tunneling microscopes, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) instruments, particle colliders, and other sophisticated scientific instruments that involve simulations as part of their underlying mechanism illustrate. These instruments belong to the "hybrid" category, and the nature of the data they offer needs to be properly understood and assessed. The inferential conception, for the reasons just indicated, can accommodate their use very naturally. But given that data manipulation is inherently involved in such hybrid instruments, it's not surprising that the status of the images they produce is different from those instruments that do not involve such manipulation, e.g., transmission electron microscopes.
It may be argued that, given the way computer simulations are built, the counterfactual conditions for simulations, (s 1 ) and (s 2 ), can be met too easily. After all, the internal dynamics of the simulation may be enough to guarantee the dependence relation between the initial data and the corresponding output from the simulation. The issue is whether the simulation is tracking external features of the environment. This is an important concern, and it suggests that there is a significant difference between simulations and scientific instruments. But it is not right to say that the counterfactual conditions for simulations are too easily satisfied. According to the iterated inferential conception, there is a process of iteration between the initial model and the corresponding simulation and later versions of them. The predictions of the simulation may be simply empirically inadequate given the available data, in which case the counterfactual conditions (s 1 ) and (s 2 ) would be violated: either some available data do not correspond to the predictions of the simulation (in which case (s 1 ) is not satisfied), or some prediction made by the simulation has no counterpart in the data (in which case (s 2 ) fails).
The emphasis on counterfactual conditions for computer simulations and instruments highlights a significant similarity between them. But instruments and simulations are importantly different as well. It has been argued that the fundamental difference between computer simulations and experiments-which typically include the use of various kinds of scientific instruments-is that experiments invoke the same material causes in the experimental group and in the target system, whereas simulations do not (Guala 2002; . It seems to me that Wendy Parker (2009) has raised significant concerns about this view, which is, of course, importantly different from the one I suggested earlier in this section. The account I offered conceives of instruments as devices to record the phenomena, whereas simulations just represent them.
I am less confident, however, about the claim that although a computer simulation is not an experiment, a computer simulation study is. Such a study, Parker notes: [. . .] consists of the broader activity that includes setting the state of the digital computer from which a simulation will evolve, triggering that evolution by starting the computer program that generates the simulation, and then collecting information regarding how various properties of the computing system, such as the values stored in various locations in its memory or the colors displayed on its monitor, evolve in light of the earlier intervention [. . .] So defined, a computer simulation study does qualify as an experiment-an experiment in which the system intervened on is a programmed digital computer. (Parker 2009, 488) Moreover, she continues, computer-simulation studies are material experiments: "experiments on real material systems" (2009, 488) . After all:
The experimental system in a computer experiment is the programmed digital computer-a physical system made of wire, plastic, etc. [. . .] In a computer simulation study [. . .] scientists learn first and foremost about the behavior of the programmed computer; from that behavior, taking various features of it to represent features of some target system, they hope to infer something of interest about the target system. (Parker 2009, 488-89) Computer-simulation studies can, of course, be thought of as material in this sense. But this suggestion doesn't highlight the crucial point of running a computer simulation, which is to allow one to infer relevant information about the target system. Parker correctly notes, at the end of the quotation above, that scientists hope to infer something relevant about the target system via a computer-simulation study. But whether simulations can be characterized as being material in a particular sense or another doesn't help us see to what extent they can be successfully put to such inferential use. As formulated by Parker, computer-simulation studies would count as material by invoking something (the programmed computer) that is largely irrelevant to the intended target system-the behavior of genetic regulatory systems, of buckyballs, or whatever system is being investigated. Since the outcome of experiments, via the use of suitable instruments, is produced by the relevant phenomena, whereas this is not the case in computer simulations, the resulting inferences are grounded on the phenomena under investigation. This fact increases their relevance-assuming that information about the relevant phenomena can be obtained directly from the relevant instruments.
In those cases in which there is no way of conducting experiments directly on the relevant phenomena, or for which it is too expensive or intractable to do so, simulations are particularly helpful. But in these cases, since causal access to the relevant target system is unavailable, the emphasis should also be on the inferential role rather than on the material nature of the vehicle of representation. After all, as noted, the material nature of the simulations, understood as material properties of the computer machinery, is, by and large, irrelevant to the phenomena under investigation. The central point is to support the relevant inferences, and this is the feature that the inferential conception emphasizes.
Having said that, there are many instances-e.g. in those cases where we are unable to obtain the relevant information directly from the target system-in which having a well-designed computer simulation may be the only way of making such inferences. These inferences will be ade-quate as long as the target system and the simulations have the relevant structure in common. Parker (2009, 491-95) highlights this point in terms of the similarity between simulations and target systems.
However, since everything is similar to everything else in some respect or another, instead of making the point in terms of similarity, it is more perspicuous to use the notion of structure preservation. The relationship between the simulation and the target system should thus be one of partial morphism-partial isomorphism, partial homormorphism, or some other structural preserving mapping-so that the simulation is partially true with regard to the information about the target system: it properly captures some relevant aspects of the system, while leaving other features behind (Bueno and French 2011; Bueno 1997; da Costa and French 2003) . In the buckyball simulation discussed above, features involving the relative position of the buckyball with regard to the silicon atoms as well as the resulting current flow between them are preserved, but information about the particular shapes of the objects in question is not.
Epistemological considerations
What is the epistemological status of simulations? What kind of information do they provide? Eric Winsberg (2010) offers an account of the epistemology of simulations that emphasizes that the credibility of a simulation is based not only on the credentials of its theoretical underpinnings, but also on "the antecedently established credentials of the modelbuilding techniques employed in its construction" (Winsberg 2010, 120) . It is on the basis of these techniques that the models that support and underlie a given simulation are constructed, and the success of the simulation ultimately depends on the credibility of these models.
In many instances, however, the models-and hence the simulations -involve entirely fictitious components that do not describe properties of the actual world, such as, for instance, artificial viscosity (Caramana et al. 1988 ) and vorticity confinement (Steinhoff and Underhill 1994) . 5 Given the presence of such fictions, an assessment of the simulations based on their truth would be entirely inadequate. Moreover, since certain simulations need to be used even when no additional empirical test is possible, truth does not provide the appropriate norm of assessment of a simulation. Central to Winsberg's account then is the contention that the reliability of a simulation does not depend on its truth.
However, how clear is the concept of reliability without truth? Usually reliability presupposes, and in fact is defined in terms of, truth: a process is reliable as long as it leads to the truth in the long run, or eventually stabilizes in the truth. One may wonder about the coherence of a conception of reliability that does not invoke truth. It would thus be better if an alternative account could be developed.
As noted above, the inferential conception of simulation suggests that the assessment of simulations need not be made in terms of truth-or reliability-but rather in terms of partial truth. If a simulation is able to capture properly the relevant features of the data, despite being inadequate with regard to other features, it will be partially true. And generally the more features of the data the simulation is able to capture while still being computationally tractable, the better it is. So clearly we find here a tradeoff between how coarse-or fine-grained a simulation is and how computationally tractable it can be. Additional dimensions are also relevant in assessing simulations. All of them are involved, for example, in the simulations of genetic regulatory systems discussed above (de Jong 2002, 91-92) . The dimensions concern whether the simulations represent the phenomena as static or dynamic, discrete or continuous, deterministic or indeterministic, qualitative or quantitative, or coarse-, average-, or finegrained. Additional trade-offs emerge, since all of these dimensions need to be compared in light of the partial truth of the resulting simulations. 6 On the inferential conception, it is the partial truth that ultimately grounds the appropriateness of a simulation. This still allows one to accommodate the important point, highlighted above, that simulations often incorporate false traits. We have, thus, a way of making sense of false features inherent in many simulations, but still adopting a coherent notion as part of their underlying goal.
Conclusions
The inferential conception of computer simulations highlights the role that is played by simulations as tools yielding inferences about new and previously available data. The conception also accommodates the integration of models, theoretical assumptions, and empirical data that is often found in the de-velopment of new simulations-all of them are crucial in the immersion, derivation, and interpretation steps. Finally, by emphasizing the counterfactual dependence condition, the inferential conception provides an important requirement for the adequacy of simulations, identifying a significant analogy between computer simulations and scientific instruments, despite the important difference between them-due to the causal interactions involved in the latter, but absent from the former. 7
Otávio Bueno University of Miami NOTES 1. For insightful accounts of computer simulations, see Humphreys (2004) , Parker (2009), and Winsberg (2010) . In the present work, "simulations" refers to computer simulations.
2. Suárez (2004) also stresses the crucial role of inference in scientific representation. 3. It should be pointed out, however, that in the case of sophisticated instruments, such as scanning tunneling microscopes or atomic force microscopes, it's not even clear how researchers could conceive the possibility of these instruments, or make sense of them, without relying on the relevant theories. In fact, these instruments rely on a fundamentally quantum mechanical phenomenon, such as the tunneling effect, which is not properly conceptualized without the use of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, the general point stands: the reliability of scientific instruments depends on conditions that are independent of whatever theories may be used to build such instruments. I will discuss these conditions below.
4. This is an adaptation and extension of the hierarchies of representation proposed by Hughes (2010, 163) .
5. Winsberg (2010, 127-32) provides discussion and additional references. 6. The notion of partial empirical adequacy can also be used here. It is equivalent to partial truth in the sense that both express adequacy with regard to the available empirical information (Bueno 1997) .
7. For extremely helpful comments, my thanks go to Axel Gelfert, Ron Giere, Paul Humphreys, Peter Luykx, Margie Morrison, Wendy Parker, Chris Pincock, and an anonymous reviewer for The Monist.
